Labor Law - \u3ci\u3eIllinois Education Association v. Board of Education of School District 218\u3c/i\u3e and \u3ci\u3eBoard of Trustees of Junior College District No. 508 v. Cook County College Treachers Union, Local 1600\u3c/i\u3e: Ominous Implications for Public Sector Collective Bargaining in Illinois by Furda, Mary Aileen O\u27Callaghan
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 8
Issue 1 Fall 1976 Article 8
1976
Labor Law - Illinois Education Association v. Board of
Education of School District 218 and Board of Trustees
of Junior College District No. 508 v. Cook County
College Treachers Union, Local 1600: Ominous
Implications for Public Sector Collective
Bargaining in Illinois
Mary Aileen O'Callaghan Furda
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mary Aileen O. Furda, Labor Law - Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education of School District 218 and Board of Trustees of
Junior College District No. 508 v. Cook County College Treachers Union, Local 1600: Ominous Implications for Public Sector Collective
Bargaining in Illinois, 8 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 209 (1976).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol8/iss1/8
LABOR LAW-Illinois Education Association v.
Board of Education of School District 218 and Board
of Trustees of Junior College District No. 508 v. Cook
County College Teachers Union, Local 1600:
Ominous Implications for Public Sector Collective
Bargaining in Illinois
For the first time in Illinois, the state supreme court has ad-
dressed the question of the legal limitations on the power of public
bodies to bargain with their employee unions. In two recent deci-
sions, Illinois Education Association v. Board of Education of
School District 218' and Board of Trustees of Junior College District
No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600,2 the
supreme court held unenforceable specific agreements contained in
collective bargaining contracts because their terms infringed on the
public body's statutory responsibilities. The court found certain
provisions in these agreements beyond the power of the public body
to negotiate. Because of their far-reaching implications, these deci-
sions may encourage the passage of a comprehensive public em-
ployee labor relations act in Illinois-an impossible task for the past
30 years.3
The author wishes to thank the Honorable Roger J. Kiley, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court
of Cook County, for providing valuable assistance in the preparation of this article. Judge
Kiley, prior to his elevation to the bench, successfully argued before the Illinois Supreme
Court as counsel for the Board of Trustees of Jr. College Dist. No. 508.
1. 62 Il1. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1975).
2. 62 II1. 2d 470, 343 N.E.2d 473 (1976).
3. In addition to legislation that has been introduced in every session of the Illinois
General Assembly since 1945, investigative commissions were appointed by two governors to
develop legislation. Neither commissions' proposal met with any success. COMMISSION ON
LABOR LAWS, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1971) [hereinafter cited as OGILVIE REPORT];
GOVERNOR'S ADVISORY COMMISSION ON LABOR-MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1967) [hereinafter cited as KERNER REPORT].
Commentators have long criticized the lack of public employee labor legislation in Illinois.
See Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REV. 885
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Edwards]; Goldstein, Current Trends in Public Employee Labor
Law in Illinois: Alice-in-Wonderland Revisited? 23 DE PAUL L. REV. 382 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Goldstein]; Kiley, A Public Employee Labor Act in Illinois? Clear Need with No
Clear Solution, 4 LoY. CHI. L.J. 309 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Kiley]; Shaw and Clark,
The Need for Public Employee Labor Legislation in Illinois, 59 ILL. B.J. 628 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Shaw and Clark]; Clark, Public Employee Labor Legislation: A Study
of the Unsuccessful Attempt to Enact a Public Employee Bargaining Statute in Illinois, 20
LAB. L.J. 164 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Clark]; Miller, Alice-in-Wonderland World of
Public Employee Bargaining, 50 CHI. B. REC. 223 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Miller!; Der-
ber, Labor Management Policy for Public Employees in Illinois: The Experience of the Gover-
nor's Commission, 21 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 541 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Derberl.
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THE CASES
lEA and Board 508: The Trial Court
Both cases involve disputes between public school boards and
public school teachers' associations under collective bargaining
agreements. In 1EA, the board and the association entered into an
agreement containing provisions for periodic evaluation of all proba-
tionary teachers.' The Board of Trustees of Junior College District
No. 508 and the Cook County College Teachers Union also agreed
to specific contract procedures for annual evaluation of non-tenured
teachers . 5
In IEA, the association filed suit on behalf of one of its members
alleging that the agreed-upon evaluation procedures were not fol-
lowed prior to the teacher's dismissal. At trial all parties admitted
that the classroom evaluation procedures in the bargaining agree-
ment had not been complied with. However, the board maintained
that the terms of the agreement were not applicable because the
dismissal was for reasons other than classroom performance.' The
trial court found the provisions of the contract applicable and the
agreement breached by the board. The court ordered the board to
reinstate the teacher.7 Since the reinstatement insured the teacher
These commentators have pointed to comprehensive legislation in force in other jurisdic-
tions. CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 3500 et seq. (West 1964), as amended, (West Supp. 1976) (provided
for collective bargaining between public employers and the elected representative of their
public employees; established an office to mediate disputes; however, the statute, known as
the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act, contains no provisions relating to strikes in the public sector);
CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 3541 et seq. (West Supp. 1976), as supplemented by Ch. 961, L. 1975,
effective July 1, 1976 (extends collective bargaining rights to public school employees);
HAWAii REV. STAT., tit. 11 §§ 89-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973) (authorizes public employers to
collectively bargain with their employees on matters of wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment; contains provisions for mediation through the office of the gover-
nor; and prohibits strikes against the government); N.Y. Civ. SERV. L. §§ 200 et seq. (McKin-
ney Supp. 1976) (known as the Taylor Act, the statute provides for collective bargaining
between political subdivisions and recognized representatives of public employees, provides
for binding arbitration of all disputes, and contains an absolute prohibition on the public
employees' right to strike); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101 et seq. (Supp. 1974) (known
as the Public Employee Relation Act, directs public employers and their employees to bargain
in good faith on wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment; gives employ-
ees a limited right to strike after the collective bargaining process has been exhausted).
4. 62 Ill. 2d at 129, 340 N.E.2d at 9.
5. 62 Ill. 2d at 473, 343 N.E.2d at 475.
6. The member had been working as an art teacher under annual contract during the
1969-70 and 1970-71 school terms. There were nine enumerated reasons for his dismissal in
the March 18th letter, dealing generally with his unacceptable and uncooperative attitude
vis-a-vis the other members of the faculty and the school administration. Only two of the
reasons given were related to his classroom performance.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 24-11 (1973) provides in pertinent part:
Any teacher who has been employed in any district as a full-time teacher for a
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his third consecutive year under contract at the school, the trial
court further ordered the board to assign him as a full-time tenured
teacher.
In comparison, Board 508, rather than the teachers union, con-
tested the power of an arbitrator to grant employment contracts to
non-tenured teachers under the terms of their collective bargaining
agreement.8 The dispute arose when the president of Malcolm X
College, one of seven junior colleges in Chicago operated by Board
508, recommended that eight non-tenured teachers at the college
not be rehired for the following school year. The union then filed a
grievance on behalf of the teachers charging the board with failure
to comply with the evaluation procedures prior to the teachers' dis-
missals. As a remedy, the union requested that an arbitrator grant
new employment contracts to the eight teachers. The court ordered
the parties to proceed to arbitration, but found that the arbitrator
did not have the authority to grant employment contracts. In grant-
ing the more restrictive relief sought by the board, the court allowed
the arbitrator to determine only whether the board had complied
with the evaluation procedures agreed upon.9
IEA and Board 508: The Appellate Court
The school board appealed the IEA decision, contending that by
ordering the teacher's reinstatement the trial court had usurped the
board's statutory grant of authority to hire and fire teachers. The
appellate court, however, concluded that the issue was controlled by
Classroom Teachers Association v. Board of Education of United
Township H.S. District No. 30,10 and found that the procedures
probationary period of 2 consecutive school terms shall enter upon contractual
continued service unless given written notice of dismissal stating the specific reason
therefor, by registered mail by the employing board at least 60 days before the end
of such period ....
8. Board 508 and the union had entered into a series of collective bargaining agreements,
beginning in 1967 when the union was recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent for all of
the board's full-time teachers. While the board and the union were negotiating the terms of
a new contract, the agreement then in force expired on December 31, 1970. The union called
a strike for January 5, 1971, and the board immediately sought an injunction in the Circuit
Court of Cook County. Following this legal action, the board and the union began negotiations
on a new collective bargaining agreement in open court, resulting in an agreement that was
incorporated into the Circuit Court's Agreed Decree in late July 1971. Subsequent to the entry
of the Agreed Decree, the board and the union invoked the court's jurisdiction to resolve
matters of interpretation of the Agreed Decree. Abstract of Record, Bd. of Trustees of Jr.
College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 22 I1. App. 3d
1061, 318 N.E.2d 193 (1974).
9. Bd. of Trustees of Jr. College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union,
Local 1600, 22 I1. App. 3d 1060, 1062-64, 318 N.E.2d 193, 194-96 (1974).
10. 15 Ill. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (1973). The court found evaluation procedures,
19761
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established in the collective bargaining agreement did not restrict
the board's statutory powers. The procedures were merely steps that
the board had agreed to follow before exercising its non-delegable
power to dismiss a teacher. Because the board had failed to comply
with the contractual prerequisites in dismissing the teacher, the
court found that he was entitled to tenure under the Illinois Teacher
Tenure Act." Since the teacher was not given proper notice at least
60 days prior to the end of his probationary period, the court decided
that the statute granted him tenure automatically."
In contrast, the union appealed the circuit court decision in Board
508. The appellate court, however, affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion, finding that:
There is . . . no question that an arbitrator is without authority
to award positions of employment in the Junior Colleges of the
State of Illinois. Under Section 3-26 of the Public Junior College
Act the Board has the power to make appointments of all teachers
13
In support of this conclusion, the court noted the collective bargain-
ing agreement contained two provisions limiting the scope of arbi-
tration with respect to the board's authority. 4
The decisions in IEA and Board 508 left the Appellate Court for
the First District divided. Within a period of three months, the
Third and Fourth Divisions of that district had rendered conflicting
determinations on the limitations on a public employer to collec-
tively bargain with its employees. These decisions, along with other
appellate decisions on similar questions, made it clear that the Illi-
nois lower courts were in a quandry over the scope of collective
bargaining in the public sector.
which appeared to infringe on the school board's statutory duty to appoint and assign teach-
ers, enforceable against the board.
11. See note 7 supra, for text of act.
12. 23 Il1. App. 3d 649, 661, 320 N.E.2d 240, 249 (1974).
13. 22 IlI. App. 3d at 1064, 318 N.E.2d at 196.
14. Id. at 1064, 318 N.E.2d at 196. Article f, Section G, of the agreement provided in
pertinent part:
The Union recognizes that the Board retains full authority to carry out the power
and duties granted to it by the Public Junior College Act and other applicable laws.
Article X, "Grievance Procedure" stated that:
The arbitrator shall limit his decision strictly to the application and interpretation
of this agreement and he shall be without power or authority to make any decision:
(2) Limiting or interfering in any way with the powers, duties and responsibilities
of the Board under applicable law.
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The Appellate Court Conflict
Several years earlier, the Appellate Court for the Second District
considered whether a board of education had the power, through a
collective bargaining agreement, to delegate matters of discretion
vested in the board by statute. In Board of Education, School Dis-
trict No. 205 v. Rockford Education Association,5 the board and the
teachers' association entered into a collective bargaining agreement
containing specific promotion procedures and providing for arbitra-
tion of all grievances arising under the agreement. An association
member was recommended for a newly created administrative posi-
tion by the superintendent of schools. When he did not get the
position, he filed a grievance pursuant to the agreement." The
board sought to enjoin the arbitration required under the contract.
The board contended that to the extent the bargaining agreement
relinquished the board's statutory power to select and promote em-
ployees to an arbitrator, it was unenforceable as a matter of law.
The lower court agreed, finding that the board could not delegate
its statutory power to appoint teachers through a collective bargain-
ing agreement or otherwise." The appellate court affirmed, holding
that discretionary powers vested in the board by statute were non-
delegable and non-arbitrable.II
One year later, however, the Appellate Court for the Third Dis-
trict held that provisions in a collective bargaining agreement which
appeared to limit a school board's statutory duty to appoint and
assign teachers, were enforceable against the board. In Classroom
Teachers Association v. Board of Education of United Township
H.S. District No. 30,"' a teacher had filed suit to prevent her invol-
untary transfer from counselor to instructor. The collective bargain-
ing agreement contained evaluation procedures, provisions for
written review, and the opportunity for a hearing prior to any invol-
untary transfer. No written report had been made before the teacher
was notified of the transfer. The board maintained that the evalua-
tion and transfer procedures were null and void because they in-
fringed on the board's absolute power to appoint and assign teach-
ers.20 Although the lower court ruled in the board's favor, the
appellate court held the provisions in the agreement neither re-
stricted the board's power to appoint teachers nor required the
15. 3 I1. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972).
16. Id. at 1092, 280 N.E.2d at 287.
17. Id. at 1093, 280 N.E.2d at 287. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 10-20, 10-20.7 (1975).
18. 3 Ill. App. 3d at 1094, 280 N.E.2d at 288.
19. 15 I1. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (1973).
20. Id. at 227, 304 N.E.2d at 517.
19761
Loyola University Law Journal
board to delegate any statutory authority. The court noted that the
procedures were merely steps, consistent with ordinary concepts of
fairness, that the board had agreed to follow before exercising its
statutory powers. 2'
The Appellate Court for the First District, Fifth Division, con-
fronted the same issue in Board of Education, South Stickney
School District III v. Johnson.2 The teacher filed a grievance pur-
suant to procedures contained in the collective bargaining agree-
ment, challenging her involuntary transfer to another position. The
board refused to arbitrate the matter, contending the assignment of
teachers was specifically reserved to the board by statute. Both the
lower court and the appellate court found that the grievance was
non-arbitrable; the power of the board to appoint all teachers could
not be limited by a collective bargaining agreement. 23 With the First
and Third Districts already at odds over what constituted the non-
delegable powers of a school board, the IEA and Board 508 decisions
created a further split within the divisions of a single district. The
First District, Third Division, maintained the question in IEA was
controlled by Classroom Teachers Association v. Board of Educa-
tion of United Township H.S. District No. 30,24 and found that the
evaluation procedures in the collective bargaining agreement did
not infringe upon the powers vested in the board by statute. On the
other hand, in Board 508, the First District, Fourth Division, relied
upon Board of Education, School District No. 205 v. Rockford Edu-
cation Association. s In so doing, the court found the arbitrator did
not have authority to award employment contracts to non-tenured
faculty members pursuant to contract grievance procedures because
employment of teachers was a non-delegable duty vested in the
board by statute.
Recognizing this conflict among and within the appellate dis-
tricts, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed this issue, adopting
neither the IEA nor the Board 508 approach. Instead the court chose
an altogether different, and rather suprising, direction.
IEA and Board 508: The Illinois Supreme Court
The Illinois Supreme Court found the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreements in both IEA and Board 508 unenforceable as a
21. Id. at 228, 304 N.E.2d at 519.
22. 21111. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974).
23. Id. at 492, 315 N.E.2d at 639. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-20.7 (1975) provides:
[school boards shall have the duty] to appoint all teachers and fix the amount of
their salaries, subject to the limitations set forth in this Act.
24. 15 I1. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (1973).
25. 3 Il. App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972).
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matter of law. In lEA, the court considered only one issue on appeal:
whether a termination in compliance with the Illinois Teacher Ten-
ure Act," was rendered invalid by the board's failure to comply with
the collective bargaining procedures. 2 Noting the school board's
absolute statutory duty to appoint and to terminate teachers, the
court went on to strictly construe the provisions of the Teacher
Tenure Act,2 1 stating:
[Nleither the powers conferred nor the rights granted by section
24-11 were restricted or expanded by the provisions of paragraph
M of Appendix XXX to the collective bargaining agreement. The
termination of [the teacher's] services having been effected in
compliance with the provisions of section 24-11 was valid, and in
ordering mandamus to issue the circuit court erred. 29
In effect, the court indicated that public bodies would not be bound
by any provisions of the collective bargaining agreements, when the
provisions are found to infringe upon or usurp any statutory powers
vested in public bodies.
In Board 508, the supreme court considered the power of an arbi-
trator to award teaching contracts to non-tenured junior college
teachers whose contracts were not renewed by the board. In dismiss-
ing the teachers, the board failed to obtain the prior advisory faculty
evaluations and recommendations required under the collective
bargaining agreement. While it was undisputed that no faculty
evaluation had been made, the court noted that the agreement es-
tablished a uniform procedure directing tenured faculty within a
department to evaluate the non-tenured teachers and make non-
binding recommendations regarding their future employment to the
college president. 0 The court accepted the board's contention that
26. See note 7 supra.
27. 62 Ill. 2d at 130, 340 N.E.2d at 9. Appendix XXX to the collective bargaining agree-
ment provided in pertinent part:
k. When any evaluation indicates the possibility that any teacher may not be
recommended for continued employment, the teacher shall be so advised in writing
with reasons and necessary improvements, if any, that may be required for this
teacher to be recommended for continued employment.
m. Discharge, demotion, or other involuntary change in the employment status
of any teacher shall be preceded by:
1). The faithful execution of the evaluation procedures for the evaluation
of classroom teaching performance and the honoring of all teachers' rights
included in this agreement and applicable statutes.
28. Id. at 130, 340 N.E.2d at 9. The court strictly construed the Act's provisions because
they created liability where none would otherwise exist.
29. Id. at 131, 340 N.E.2d at 9.
30. Additional Abstract of Record of Board of Trustees of Junior College District No. 508
19761
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even if these evaluations were made, they would be advisory only,
and not binding on the board's final decision." The court believed
that the IEA holding dictated the result in this case. Since the
board's statutory authority to appoint teachers was non-delegable,
the arbitrator lacked authority to award an employment contract
for violation of the collective bargaining agreement procedure.2 Fur-
ther, the court found the appellate court's decision that an arbitra-
tor could require reevaluation in compliance with the procedures
outlined in the bargaining agreement incompatible with its own
opinion in IEA. Holding non-renewal of the teachers' contracts valid
despite non-compliance with the agreed-upon evaluation proce-
dures, the court stated, "[li]t is clear that the evaluation procedure
is not enforceable against the Board. '3
THE IMPACT
The IEA and Board 508 decisions mark the first time that the
Illinois Supreme Court has considered the limitations on a public
as Appellee at 14-15, Bd. of Trustees of Jr. College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College
Teachers Union, Local 1600, 22 111. App. 3d 1061, 318 N.E.2d 193 (1974). The relevant portions
of Article VIII, Section J, provide:
Employment and Tenure Policy.
1. Initial employment and renewal of employment contract.
a. Recommendations on initial employment . ..and renewal of employ-
ment contracts on non-tenured faculty members shall be made by the eligi-
ble members of the department or a committee of their democratically cho-
sen representatives. . . . However decisions concerning the recommenda-
tion of tenure contracts shall be made only by the tenured members of the
department, except as provided for in c below.
b. The criteria for, and the procedures by which, recommendations on ini-
tial employment and the renewal of employment contracts are to be made
shall be agreed upon by a majority of the eligible members of the department
and shall be published in writing for the members of the department ....
c. Voting on candidates for renewal of contract other than tenure contracts
shall be limited to those eligible members who have at least two semesters
more continuous full-time service in the department than has the candidate
except that all tenured members may vote on all candidates and only ten-
ured members shall vote on the granting of tenure contracts. . . .Recom-
mendations not to renew an employment contract will be by majority vote
by secret ballot.
d. Such recommendations on initial employment and renewal of employ-
ment contracts and tenure contracts shall be forwarded in writing by the
Department Chairman together with his views to the Campus Head. If the
Campus Head does not accept the recommendation of the department, then
he shall state his reasons in writing to the Department Chairman, who in
turn shall inform the eligible members of the department.
31. Bd. of Trustees of Jr. College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union,
Local 1600, 62 Il1. 2d 470, 475, 343 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1976).
32. Id. at 476, 343 N.E.2d at 476.
33. Id.
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body's power to collectively bargain with its employees. In this
court's previous decisions, the emphasis has been on the right of
public employees to strike. 4 Although it has long been understood
that public bodies cannot delegate their statutory powers,3" it has
been assumed that such bodies would be bound by any collective
bargaining agreements that they chose to enter." After IEA and
Board 508, however, this assumption is suspect, if not altogether
incorrect. It appears that these two decisions, when viewed with an
earlier Illinois Supreme Court case, virtually strip public employees
of any leverage at the collective bargaining table.
City of Pana v. Crowel
In this case, the Circuit Court of Christian County issued a per-
manent injunction restraining the employees of the Pana water,
sewer, street, and police departments from striking. The Illinois
Appellate Court reversed, finding that the Illinois Anti-Injunction
Act38 applied. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the circuit
34. See City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974) (anti-injunction act
is not applicable to strikes by public employees); County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d 166,
265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971) (anti-injunction act is applicable to
a strike by employees of a county-owned nursing home); Bd. of Educ. v. Kankakee Fed'n. of
Teachers, 46 Ill. 2d 439, 264 N.E.2d 18 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971) (strikes by
school employees are an unlawful violation of public policy); Bd. of Educ. of Community
School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) (strikes by school
employees are prohibited by public policy).
35. Anderson v. Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 91, 390 Ill. 412, 61 N.E.2d 562 (1945)
(school board has statutory power to contract with whomever it desires); Lindblad v. Bd. of
Educ. of Normal School Dist., 221 11. 261, 77 N.E. 450 (1906) (school district could not
delegate power to hire and fire teachers to a superintendent); Bd. of Educ., S. Stickney School
Dist. III v. Johnson, 21 111. App. 3d 482, 315 N.E.2d 634 (1974) (power to transfer teachers
cannot be delegated); Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 205 v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n., 3 I1.
App. 3d 1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972) (power to appoint teachiers cannot be delegated); Elder
v. Bd. of Educ. of School Dist. No. 127 1/2, 60 11. App. 2d 56, 208 N.E.2d 423 (1965) (power
to appoint teachers cannot be delegated); Stroh v. Casner, 201 Ill. App. 281 (1916) (power to
appoint teachers cannot be delegated).
36. Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Bd. of Educ. of United Township H.S. Dist. No. 30, 15
Ill. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516 (1973) (court held that the procedures outlines in the
collective bargaining agreement did not limit the ultimate power of the board to make deci-
sions, and for that reason the procedures were enforceable against the board as a matter of
fundamental fairness); Chicago Div. of Illinois Educ. Ass'n. v. Bd. of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d
456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966) (appellate court held that the board had the power and the right,
but not the duty, to enter into a collective bargaining agreement with the Chicago Teachers
Union as exclusive bargaining agent. The Supreme Court refused review, thus letting stand
the notion that a public school board did not require legislative authority to enter into a
collective bargaining agreement with its employees).
37. 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974). For an excellent discussion of the case see
Comment, Labor Law-The Illinois Anti-Injunction Act Is Not Applicable To Strikes by
Public Sector Employees and Such Strikes Are Illegal Per Se-City of Pana v. Crowe, 6 Loy.
Cm. L.J. 187 (1975).
38. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 2a (1973). The statute provides in relevant part:
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court decision holding that the Anti-Injunction Act was not appli-
cable to an unlawful strike by public employees. The court found
no reason to
depart in this case from the long-standing rule that public employ-
ees have no right to strike and that a strike by them is unlawful
and therefore not within the scope of the anti-injunction act. 39
Pana resolved the lower court conflict which followed earlier su-
preme court decisions,40 and established that all strikes by public
employees are illegal in Illinois. In effect, this decision made a "no-
strike" provision present in public sector collective bargaining
agreements a mere formality rather than a bargained-for contract
term. Still, the overall impact of Pana in the public sector has been
slight. Because the Pana court was concerned only with what the
union could or could not do, it did not consider issues outside of or
beyond the union's control. The union in Pana could ignore the
court's decision and, in fact, did.' Other public employees' unions
and associations throughout Illinois have been similarly unim-
pressed with Pana, as evidenced by the still significant number of
strikes involving public employees since the decision.
In fact, strikes by public employees have been illegal since 1925, 3
but the number of such strikes in Illinois remains high, Pana not-
withstanding. While the law provides the public employer a remedy,
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of this State, or
by a judge or the judges thereof in any case involving or growing out of a dispute
concerning terms or conditions of employment, enjoining or restraining any person
or persons, either singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from peaceably and without threats
or intimidation recommending, advising or persuading others to do so ....
39. 57 Ill. 2d at 552, 316 N.E.2d at 515.
40. In two earlier decisions the court had held the anti-injunction act applicable to a strike
by the employees of a county-owned nursing home, County of Peoria v. Benedict, 47 Ill. 2d
166, 265 N.E.2d 141 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 929 (1971); and to a strike by the employees
of a not-for-profit hospital, Peters v. S. Chicago Community Hosp., 44 III. 2d 22, 253 N.E.2d
375 (1969).
41. The work stoppage continued until negotiators worked out a collective bargaining
agreement between the city and its employees.
42. Statistics supplied by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
indicate that Illinois suffered 29 work stoppages idling 8,800 workers in 1972, 32 work stop-
pages idling 28,900 workers in 1973, and 26 work stoppages idling 4,500 workers in 1974. The
number of workers idled in 1973 was significantly higher only because of the Chicago Teachers
Union strike in January 1973 idling between 11,000 and 14,000 teachers. The total number of
work stoppages in 1974 was six less than in 1973 but was still significant. Even after Pana
Illinois registered the fifth highest number of strikes in the United States. U.S. DEP'T. OF
LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1972, REPORT 434, at
7 (1974). U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN
GOVERNMENT, 1973, REPORT 437, at 7 (1975), and U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, WORK STOPPAGES IN GOVERNMENT, 1974, REPORT 453, at 7 (1976).
43. Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1147 (1971).
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few public bodies in a labor-oriented state like Illinois seek injunc-
tions against illegal public employees' strikes.44 For this reason, the
strike still remains the unions' most effective weapon to force con-
cessions from the public employer at the bargaining table.
Public employees contend that the right to strike is an absolute
necessity. Without such power, public employees' representatives
would have little leverage at the bargaining table. They would have
few concessions to offer in the give-and-take of collective bargain-
ing. Without the right to strike, the bargaining representatives
would have only one choice-acceptance of the employer's last offer.
The unions and associations would be left with no bargaining power
to extract concessions and benefits for their members. In the ab-
sence of any comprehensive legislation and despite the illegality of
strikes in the public sector,4" a typical collective bargaining agree-
ment between a public employer and employees still contains a no-
strike provision." Employees' bargaining representatives, normally
give a no-strike pledge in exchange for concessions and benefits for
union members. When that agreement expires, the representative
will often use the threat of a work stoppage to elicit an even more
favorable agreement. Given the repeated success of this approach,
it is not suprising that public employees' unions and associations
have been reluctant to accept a statutory prohibition on the right
to strike.
After IEA and Board 508
In IEA and Board 508 the court was asked, for the first time, to
consider what the public employer can and cannot do in collective
44. See Goldstein, note 3 supra; and Miller, note 3 supra. It is not economically feasible
to have mass firings when public employees strike, nor is it politically sound to enjoin strikes
in a state where a large percentage of the electorate are union members. Board 508, however,
has sought injunctions against the college teachers union on two occasions. The union ignored
the injunctions in both August, 1966 and August, 1975; union president Norman Swenson was
cited for contempt on both occasions. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 10, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
45. See City of Pana v. Crowe, 57 Ill. 2d 547, 316 N.E.2d 513 (1974); Bd. of Educ. of
Community School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding, 32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965).
46. See note 30 supra. The Agreement between Board 508 and the union provides:
ARTICLE XIII-NO STRIKE PLEDGE
The Union and the Board subscribe to the principle that any and all differences
shall be resolved by peaceful and appropriate means without interruption of the
College program. The Union therefore agrees that it will not instigate, engage in,
support, encourage, or condone any strike, work stoppage, or other concerted refusal
to perform work by the faculty members covered by this Agreement. Differences
between the parties concerning the meaning, interpretation or application of this
Agreement shall be resolved by utilization of the Grievance Procedure set forth in
Article X hereof or by other lawful and peaceful means available under the law of
Illinois.
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bargaining-an issue completely outside union control. Because
these decisions shift the emphasis in collective bargaining from the
actions of the union to the authority of the public employer, they
should have significant impact on public employee organizations.
As envisioned by one commentator, 7 these decisions lead to the very
real possibility that public employers may not feel obligated to com-
ply with the terms of their collective bargaining agreements.
While Pana has had little practical effect in the area, IEA and
Board 508 could radically change the collective bargaining climate
in Illinois. The public employer, intent on avoiding a strike by his
employees, can submit to their terms at the bargaining table. While
appearing to bargain in good faith, he can elicit concessions from
the employees' representatives in exchange for each term by which
he agrees to be bound. This supposed agreement covering employ-
ment procedures, wage scales, working conditions, fringe benefits
and grievance procedures providing for compulsory arbitration of all
disputes, can be drawn up and signed by both parties, and ratified
by the union. Then, claiming the terms include non-delegable statu-
tory powers, the employer can go into court at some future time to
void the agreement. The union representatives will never know, as
they sit across the bargaining table and make their concessions,
what, if anything, they are gaining for their members. The politi-
cally aware and legally astute public employer will realize that after
lEA and Board 508, almost nothing conceded at the bargaining
table can be enforced against the public employer in the absence of
a statute; therefore, almost all concessions made in the collective
bargaining process can be avoided through later court action."
Possibility: The Passage of an Act
Once the impact of the IEA and Board 508 decisions is appre-
ciated, a well-drafted public employee labor relations act may have
an excellent chance of passing both houses of the Illinois General
Assembly and reaching the governor's desk, for the first time since
47. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 927-28:
Good faith bargaining cannot thrive when public employers are led to believe that
they may escape consequences of a bad bargain by postnegotiations court challenge
on grounds that the disputed contract was ultra vires. In such an atmosphere, the
employer may be tempted to choose the easy path of agreeing to contract provisions
with which it cannot comply and which it has no intention of honoring.
48. For example, it is clear after Bd. of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n., 3 Il1. App. 3d
1090, 280 N.E.2d 286 (1972), that matters of educational policy are not negotiable in the
absence of enabling legislation. But what is included under educational policy? Is class size?
Boards of Education say yes; teachers say no, it is a working condition. See Note, Teacher
Negotiations in Illinois: Current Status and Proposed Reforms, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 307.
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1945.40 It seems clear that after these two decisions, public employ-
ees' labor organizations will feel a need for such legislation to protect
their own interests. In the past, their opposition to proposed forms
of public sector legislation made passage impossible."0
At one time public employees' labor organizations strongly fa-
vored passage of comprehensive public employee labor relations leg-
islation, believing that such legislative authority was necessary to
organize public employees. Since that time, however, court determi-
nations have given employees the right to organize' and public
employers the right to recognize and bargain with such employee
organizations.5 2 With the one obstacle to organization removed
without legislative action, the mood of public employees' unions
and associations toward comprehensive legislation began to change.
A graphic example of this change in attitude was the American
Federation of Teachers' (AFT) actions in the aftermath of the Ker-
ner Report. s3 The AFT had been one of the labor groups originally
voicing support for legislation, even legislation containing a strike
prohibition, that would provide for public sector collective bargain-
ing. During the course of the legislative session, however, the AFT's
attitude changed. AFT chapters in Chicago (Chicago Teachers
Union) and in other large cities throughout the country were making
impressive gains at the bargaining table through use of the strike
and the strike threat. Although public employee strikes were and
still are illegal in Illinois, the Chicago Teachers Union had used the
threat of a work stoppage to gain a new agreement with the Chicago
49. The first public employee labor relations bill was introduced in the Illinois General
Assembly during the 1945 session (S.B. 427). The bill reached the governor's desk, but was
vetoed by Governor Dwight H. Green on July 26, 1945. No bill introduced since that time
has ever passed both the Senate and the House. As recently as July 1, 1976, during the special
appropriations session of the General Assembly, an effort was made to bring a collective
bargaining bill to a vote on the floor of the House. The bill was designed to cover the costs of
collective bargaining agreements reached under terms of Executive Order No. 6 issued by
Gov. Dan Walker September 4, 1973. The Senate took the position that a contract with a
public employees' union was not binding on the legislature unless the General Assembly was
included in the bargaining process. See ILLINOIS ISSUES, August, 1976, The State of the State,
at 24, col. 1-2.
50. See Derber, note 3 supra, for an excellent discussion of how the opposition of public
employees' labor organizations helped to defeat the legislation growing out of the KERNER
REPORT.
51. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (the court held that public
employees have First Amendment rights to join and form unions).
52. Chicago Div. of Illinois Educ. Ass'n. v. Bd. of Educ., 76 Ill. App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d
243 (1966). The appellate court held that the board had the power and right, but not the duty,
to collectively bargain. But see Lewallen v. Indianapolis Educ. Ass'n., 72 L.R.R.M. 2071 (7th
Cir. 1969). However it must be noted that Indiana is not a labor oriented state like Illinois.
Few public bodies have sought such a ruling in this state.
53. See KERNER REPORT, note 3 supra.
19761
Loyola University Law Journal
Board of Education. The Cook County College Teachers Union had
used similar tactics to force a settlement with the Cook County
Junior College Board." Consequently, the AFT became a vigorous
opponent of the governor's bill with its mandatory no-strike provi-
sion. 5  Other public employees' unions and associations, with ex-
periences similar to AFT's, felt the same way about a bill with a
no-strike provision and helped to defeat the legislation." The strike
/no-strike issue became, and remains, the major stumbling block to
passage of comprehensive labor legislation for the public sector.
Labor leaders argue that the absence of the strike weapon in the
public sector reduces collective bargaining to collective begging.57
Such a feeling was expressed by the union in Board 508:
It is obvious that any decision which leaves fundamental provi-
sions of the collective bargaining agreement dealing with basic
issues of employment effectively unenforceable, while still assert-
ing employment of severe penalties for peaceful work stoppages to
obtain employment contracts, will render public sector collective
bargaining relations in a shambles."
Massive union opposition to no-strike provisions has helped to de-
feat bill after bill in session after session of the Illinois General
Assembly.59 Public employees' unions and associations have found
no collective bargaining legislation preferable to an act that places
any limitation on the public employees' right to strike.
The past, and present, focus on the strike/no-strike issue is really
an exercise in abstractions. The laws of this state have always for-
bidden the use of the strike in the public sector; yet, public employ-
ees continue to strike. One need only observe the semi-annual work
stoppage by the Chicago teachers to realize how meaningless the
judicial prohibitions have been."° While it is true there is a remedy
for illegal strikes-the injunction-few public bodies will invite the
wrath of their organized labor constituency by seeking to enjoin a
54. Pursuant to Iu.. RE v. STAT. ch. 122, § 1-1 et seq. (1975), the Cook County Junior
College Board became the Board of Trustees of Junior College District No. 508.
55. See Derber, note 3 supra, at 552-53.
56. Id. at 556-57.
57. See Edwards, note 3 supra, at 892.
58. Brief of the Cook County College Teachers Union as Appellant at 40, Bd. of Trustees
of Junior College Dist. No. 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, Local 1600, 22 Il.
App. 3d 1060, 318 N.E.2d 193 (1974).
59. See Edwards, supra note 3; Goldstein, supra note 3; Kiley, supra note 3; Shaw and
Clark, supra note 3; Clark, supra note 3; Miller, supra note 3; and Derber, supra note 3.
60. See Chicago Tribune, May 22, 1969, § 1 at 1, col. 1; Chicago Tribune, Jan. 12, 1971,
§ 1 at 1, col. 5; Chicago Tribune, Jan. 10, 1973, § 1 at 1, col. 1; and Chicago Tribune, Sept.
3, 1975, § 1 at 1, col. 5.
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strike." By court decree, no one except the state or the public body
affected have standing to seek injunctive relief from a strike in the
public sector.2
After IEA and Board 508, the focus in the public sector may shift
from the no-strike controversy to a new issue-the enforceability of
a collective bargaining agreement. Until now, it has always been
assumed that a public sector collective bargaining agreement, like
all other collective bargaining agreements, was sacrosant-no more.
IEA and Board 508 may mean that public bodies in Illinois are
bound by few, if any, terms of an agreement that infringe upon their
statutory powers. The boards in these cases were not bound by the
evaluation procedures that they had agreed to follow before dismiss-
ing teachers, because the School Code"3 and the Public Junior Col-
lege Act" grant the public bodies the absolute statutory power to
hire and fire personnel. Arguably, the boards could not be bound by
wage agreements either, since the same acts give them absolute
power to fix salaries and set wage schedules." With the enforceabil-
ity of their collective bargaining agreements highly questionable
after IEA and Board 508, public employees' unions and associations
should be ready to seek the protection of their interests through
enactment of comprehensive legislation.
CONCLUSION
Public employees' unions and associations may now be ready to
accept an act which prohibits strikes, or contains a less than abso-
lute right to strike, in order to guarantee enforceability of their
collective bargaining agreements. Unions will likely ignore whatever
a statute may say about work stoppages; just as they have continued
to ignore judicial pronouncements. Looking to other states that have
enacted comprehensive legislation, it appears that a no-strike provi-
sion in a statute is no guarantee against a work stoppage in the
public sector. Illinois labor organizations should accept an act to
61. See note 44 supra for notable exceptions.
62. Allen v. Maurer, 6 Ill. App. 3d 633, 286 N.E.2d 135 (1972).
63. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 1-1 et seq. (1975).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, §§ 101-1 et seq. (1975).
65. This assertion seems valid in the aftermath of the Chicago Board of Education's
actions in closing the public schools 16 days early, despite a collective bargaining agreement
with the Chicago Teachers Union guaranteeing 39 weeks salary, when the board ran out of
funds. Although the union has threatened to take legal action, it had not done so by October
1976. It appears that the present state of the law supports the actions of the board and would
preclude relief to the union. (Chicago Tribune, June 3, 1976, § 1 at 1, col. 2.).
66. The Taylor Act in New York is generally recognized as a strict no-strike statute, and
yet the state has suffered through 27 work stoppages idling 22,600 workers in 1972, 16 work
stoppages idling 3,000 workers in 1973, and 18 work stoppages idling 9,600 workers in 1974.
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ensure that the public employer will be obligated to comply with
agreed upon terms concerning wage scales, fringe benefits, working
conditions, and evaluation procedures. More importantly perhaps,
the unions and associations will accept an act which gives the public
employer the right to agree to a formal grievance procedure with
provisions for binding arbitration of all disputes arising under the
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. If such a statute were
presently in effect in Illinois, IEA and Board 508 could not have
been decided as they were. The court could not have found that
"[a] termination in compliance with the statute was valid notwith-
standing a failure to comply with the evaluation provisions of the
collective bargaining agreement." 7 The supreme court would have
been obligated to order the school boards to comply with the evalua-
tion procedures in the collective bargaining agreement under a com-
prehensive public employee labor relations act.
Although much criticism has been leveled at the courts of this
state for their past indecision in the public employee labor relations
area, the supreme court's decisions in IEA and Board 508 are
graphic examples of the judicial process in action. The court has not
retreated from its refusal to fill a gap created by legislative inaction;
it has, instead, so completely dismembered the concept of collective
bargaining in the public sector that the legislature will be forced to
act. These two decisions should ensure that public employees' un-
ions and associations will now work together with the General As-
sembly to pass comprehensive legislation to govern collective bar-
gaining in the public sector.
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